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INTRODUCTION
The Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002 (SOX) created the Public Company Accounting Advisory
Board (PCAOB), which “oversees the audits of public companies and SEC-registered brokers and
dealers in order to protect investors and further the public interest” (PCAOB, 2020). One of the
provisions included in SOX replaced the previous self-regulated peer-review program with an
inspection process controlled by the agency. The revised process aimed to protect the interests of
investors and improve auditor credibility (Robertson, 2010). As part of this process, inspection
staff review an audit firm’s quality control system and evaluate audit procedures performed on a
sample of engagements (Abbot et al. 2016). Inspections are performed annually for large firms
(>100 clients) and triennially for smaller audit firms (<100 clients). The PCAOB inspects
registered firms to assess their level of compliance with “the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the rules of the
Board, the rules of the SEC, and professional standards in connection with the firm’s performance
of audits” (PCAOB, 2020).
The outcome of the inspection process is a publicly available report. Part I of the report
summarizes audit deficiencies identified through the inspection process.

This includes

deficiencies of such significance that it appeared the firm did not have enough evidence to support
its opinion on the financial statements of ICFR (Guide to Reading the PCAOB…). Part II provides
observations related to the audit firm’s quality control systems. Quality control criticisms can be
related to independence, personal management, client acceptance, engagement performance, and
monitoring. (“Inspection Procedures). Quality control criticisms are revealed in the public report
only if the firm fails to address the criticisms to the Board’s satisfaction within 12 months of the
issuance of the original report (“Inspection Procedures”).
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The PCAOB affirms that the purpose of the inspection process is “to accurately assess,
drive improvement in, and communicate audit quality” (PCAOB, 2020) They warn against
extrapolating results to draw large conclusions on the quality of audit firms. Despite this warning,
prior research shows in the following section that there is a significant market response to the
release of inspection reports, suggesting investors may view reports as a significant signal of audit
quality. While prior research has examined the market’s reaction to PCAOB inspection reports,
these studies were completed prior to changes in the report’s format. The objective of this study
is to provide new evidence on whether the redesigned PCAOB inspection reports affect the
market’s perception of audit quality. Specifically, I examine whether clients of auditors with a
greater number of identified deficiencies suffer more adverse market reactions when an inspection
report is released.

BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH
PCAOB Inspection Reports
The inspection report process has undergone multiple revisions, with the most recent
occurring in 2018. Beginning in 2018 the PCAOB developed a new inspection report intended to
meet the needs of their stakeholders more effectively. Per the PCAOB, this new report improves
readability for investors and other stakeholders, uses data tools to improve accessibility, and
reduces the use of technical language (PCOAB, 2018). It is divided into five parts: introduction,
overview of historical data, inspection observations, quality control observations, and the firm’s
response to the draft inspection report (PCAOB, 2018). The introduction section offers investors
and other readers a high-level overview of firm’s compliance with PCAOB requirements. The
overview of historical data sections previously included one year of data for annually inspected
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firms but was updated to include three years. This increases comparability and recognizes temporal
changes in scope and process, which increases understandability. The inspection observations
section is divided into two sub-sections, Part I.A and Part I.B. Part I.A. provides a summary of
audits inspected and discusses those that were found to have unsupported opinions This discussion
includes a description of the deficiency and an assessment of the relative significance or nature of
the accounts/disclosures affected. Part I.A provides a breakdown of deficiencies by category, for
example, “revenue recognition” or “related-party relationship transactions.” This ensures that the
most relevant information is displayed first. (“PCAOB posts Guide to Reading the PCAOB's New
Inspection Report.”, (2018)). Part I. B. identifies other instances of non-compliance that may not
have caused insufficient information for an unqualified opinion, but nevertheless violated PCAOB
rules and standards. This new addition to the report looks to increase transparency, thereby
increasing investor confidence and improving auditor credibility.

The next section of the inspection report summarizes observations related to the audit
firm’s quality control systems. These observations are generally negative and relate to weaknesses
in the firm’s systems. For each observation, prior to the issuance of the report, firms are given the
opportunity to respond to these concerns within a 12-month period after the draft report is issued,
but if no action is taken, the deficiency is issued publicly. The final section of the report is the
Appendix, which can include a written statement from the firm in response to the inspection report
if they choose to provide one.

PCAOB Inspection Reports as a Measure of Audit Quality

The primary purpose of an audit is to provide an independent verification that the financial
statements of a company are, in all material respects, in accordance with GAAP. In addition to
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providing assurance, a high-quality audit increases the integrity of funded programs, identifies
possible non-compliance issues, reduces the risk of future non-compliance, and increases goodwill
among taxpayers, donors, and other key stakeholders (AICPA, 2018). A high-quality audit can
reduce agency costs and information asymmetry which supports credibility for managers in the
eyes of shareholders. It can also improve earnings quality and provide more useful and reliable
information to capital markets (Huang and Kang, 2015). Conversely, the consequences of a lowquality audit can include restatements, litigation, and going-concern opinions that negatively
impact investors (Huang and Kang, 2015). Because of these positive and negative effects, audit
quality is a primary determinant of auditor selection and is meaningful to investors and
stakeholders.

PCAOB inspection reports have the potential to be used as a measure of audit quality
(Aobdia, 2019). Both audit professionals and investors, “associate fewer identified audit
deficiencies with higher audit quality” (Christensen 2016, pg. 4). This view is held by most of each
group; “75.3 percent of auditors and 65.4 percent of investors associate fewer inspection findings
by the PCAOB with higher audit quality” (Christensen 2016, pg. 29). In addition, PCAOB
inspection reports change investor’s perceptions of audit quality (Offermanns 2011). The sizeadjusted stock returns of clients audited by inspected firms exhibit abnormal variances during the
period around the release date of the inspection report, suggesting that investors use the reports to
make decisions. Suggesting investors’ perceptions might be accurate, Gunny and Zhang (2013)
find that PCAOB inspection reports that reported significant deficiencies were indicative of lower
audit quality, reflected in a greater number of restatements and higher levels of abnormal current
accruals. Robertson, Stefeniak, and Houston (2014) find PCAOB inspection reports, and the
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related investor response can ultimately lead to an increased likelihood executive will consider
switching auditors.

While there are evidence PCAOB inspection reports are a measure of audit quality used by
investors and other parties, not all evidence supports this conclusion. Lennox and Pittman (2010)
find the market share of audit firms is insensitive to the issuance of a negative PCAOB inspection
report. The study asserts that “if audit clients view PCAOB reports as being informative about
differences in audit firm quality … clients would appoint (dismiss) audit firms that receive
favorable (unfavorable) reports” (Lennox and Pittman, 2010, pg. 85). The authors suggest the
reports lack of informational value may be due to the fact: (1) they do not provide an overall
“opinion” on the quality of the firm, and (2) they do not disclose information related to the firm’s
quality control system.
Nagy (2014) supports Lennox and Pittman’s conclusion that the lack of public disclosure
of quality control criticisms within the PCAOB inspection report results in the lack of
informational value to investors and clients. The study suggests PCAOB inspection reports have
limited information value because contemporaneous quality control criticisms are not included.
DeFond (2010) finds that the PCAOB inspection reports are less informative than pre-SOX Peer
Reviews and poses PCAOB inspections are not representative, as they target the riskiest audits for
review.

HYPOTHESIS
The PCAOB did not implement the inspection process for the sole purpose of providing
value-relevant information toto investors and clients; the primary objective is to maintain audit
quality. Despite the PCAOB’s intentions, because findings are publicly revealed, investors and
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clients may utilize inspection reports as a signal of audit quality. Prior research on the value
relevance of PCAOB inspection reports is mixed, and there have been substantial updates to the
PCAOB inspection report process and presentation since prior studies were published.
Responding to this gap in the extant literature, this study examines the market response to PCAOB
inspection reports,
The expectation is the market’s reaction to PCAOB inspection reports will vary with the
content of the reports. Specifically, the reaction will be significantly worse when the findings in
the inspection report are more negative. This expectation is supported by prior literature. There
are prior evidence investors react to the release of the reports (Aobdia, 2019) and perceive more
inspection findings as an indication of worse audit quality (Christensen 2016). This leads to the
hypothesis, stated in alternative form:

H1: Clients of an auditor with more deficiencies in their PCAOB inspection report will
experience a more negative (or less positive) market reaction to the report’s release.

METHODOLOGY
For the 20 largest audit firms in the period from 2010 to 2020, I obtain data from the
publicly available inspection reports on the PCAOB’s website. For each inspection report I
manually code the report’s content. Information from the report is then matched with client
information from Compustat. I then drop clients without auditor information in Audit Analytics
and price information on CRSP. This selection methodology yields a sample of 43,307 client firmreport observations. Table 1 presents my sample attrition.
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Table 1
Sample Selection
Observations in Compustat for the period 2010 - 2020
Less:
Companies not matched with PCAOB inspected auditor
Companies without necessary CRSP

123,181
(43,449)
(36,425)

Final Sample

43,307

Note: PCAOB inspection data was not available because either the auditor did not have a unique identified in
Compustat, or the auditor was not one of the top 20 largest auditors of public companies.

To examine the hypothesis, I define the variable CAR as the average of firms’ value
weighted cumulative abnormal returns over a 5-day period (t-2 through t+2) surrounding the
inspection report release date. I then define DEF_PCT by taking the total # of deficient audits
identified in an inspection report and dividing by the total # of audits reviewed. To test the
hypotheses, I examine whether CAR varies between clients of auditors with a high deficiency
percentage and clients of auditors with a low deficiency percentage.

The binary variable

MED_DEF_PCT is coded 1 if a client engages an auditor with a deficiency percentage
(DEF_PCT) greater than the median value, and 0 otherwise. The binary variable Q4_DEF_PCT
is coded 1 if a client engages an auditor with a deficiency percentage (DEF_PCT) in the upper
quartile, and 0 otherwise.

RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. The average firm engages an auditor
that had deficiencies identified for approximately 34 percent of inspected engagements
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(DEF_PCT). The mean value of CAR is zero, suggesting the average firm does not experience an
abnormal market reaction to the release of their auditor’s inspection report.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics

Variable
DEF_PCT
CAR

n
43,307
43,307

Mean
0.34
0.00

Median
0.33
0.00

Q1
0.15
0.06

Q3
0.24
-0.02

Std. Dev.
0.43
0.02

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample comprising 43,307 firm-year observations. All variable
definitions are provided in Appendix A.

Cumulative Abnormal Returns
The first hypothesis suggests the value of CAR will be significantly lower for firms that
engage an auditor with more deficiencies in their PCAOB inspection report. To test the hypothesis,
I conduct a t-test to examine differences between clients of auditors with a deficiency percentage
above the median value (MED_DEF_PCT = 1)and clients of auditors with a deficiency percentage
below the median value (MED_DEF_PCT = 0). Results, presented in Panel A of Table 3, show
firms the engaged auditors with a lower deficiency percentage (MED_DEF_PCT = 0), experienced
average abnormal returns of 0.0066 during the 5-day period surrounding the release of the PCAOB
inspection report. For firms that engaged auditors with a greater deficiency percentage
(MED_DEF_PCT = 1), the mean value of CAR is .0018. Critically, the difference between the two
reactions is significant (p < 0.01). Consistent with H1, this suggests firms that engage an auditor
with a greater deficiency percentage experience lower cumulative abnormal returns around the
report’s release.
Panel B of Table 3 compares the mean value of CAR for clients that engage auditors into
upper quartile of DEF_PCT (Q4_DEF_PCT = 1) against those in the lower three quartiles
(Q4_DEF_PCT = 0). For firms in the upper quartile, the mean value of CAR is .0005 and for firms
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in the lower three quartiles, the mean value of CAR is 0.0052. The difference between the two
groups is significant (p < 0.01). In both Panel A and Panel B the results support H1; clients of an
auditor with more deficiencies in their PCAOB inspection report experience a lower abnormal
return around the report’s release.
Table 3
Tests of Differences
Panel A: Median Split
FULL SAMPLE
MED_DEF_PCT=0
MED_DEF_PCT=1

Obs.
19,539
23,868

Mean CAR
0.0066
0.0018

Difference

(0.0048)
***

Panel B: Fourth Quartile Split
FULL SAMPLE
A_O_PRESS
Q4_DEF_PCT=0
Q4_DEF_PCT=1
Difference

Obs.
32084
11223

Mean CAR
0.0052
0.0005
(0.0047)
***

Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variable CAR. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01,
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. See Appendix A for a detailed description of all variables.

CONCLUSION
This study examines the market’s reaction to PCAOB inspection reports, and whether this
reaction varies with report content. The results show the average client experiences positive
abnormal returns are the release of their auditor’s inspection report. This reaction varies, firms
that engage an auditor with a higher percentage of deficiencies within their PCAOB inspection
reports experience lower cumulative abnormal returns to the report’s release than firms that engage
an auditor with a lower percentage of deficiencies within their PCAOB inspection reports. Taken
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as a whole, the results suggest the market responds to inspection reports, and the response is
informed by the report’s content. This indicates that investors perceive the reports to be a
meaningful signal of audit quality.
The results of this study should be of interest to several parties. First, the results add new
evidence to a robust stream of literature and therefore should be of interest to academics. While
prior research on the information content of PCAOB inspection reports provide mixed results, my
study uses a more recent sample and finds inspection reports are perceived to be an indication of
audit quality. Second, this study should be of interest to regulators. Regulators have warned
against extrapolating results from inspections and drawing large conclusions on the quality of audit
firms (PCAOB 2020). My results suggest this warning has not stopped investors from reacting the
content of inspection reports. Finally, this study should be of interest to auditors and their clients.
The results suggest there are salient consequences to poor PCAOB inspection reports. This should
provide auditors motivation to maintain high audit quality, and client’s motivation to consider
PCAOB inspection reports when selecting an auditor.
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions (Alphabetical)
The average of firms’ value weighted cumulative abnormal returns over a
5-day period (t-2 through t+2) surrounding the inspection report release
date.
Indicator variable equal to the total # of deficient audits identified in an
DEF_PCT
inspection report divided by the total # of audits reviewed
Binary variable MED_DEF_PCT is coded 1 if a client engages an auditor
MED_DEF_PCT with a deficiency percentage (DEF_PCT) greater than the median value,
and 0 otherwise
Binary variable Q4_DEF_PCT is coded 1 if a client engages an auditor
Q4_DEF_PCT
with a deficiency percentage (DEF_PCT) in the upper quartile, and 0
otherwise
CAR
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